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1. Introduction 
Professor Garraway and the organizers of this panel asked me to address a piece by Professor Adam Roberts entitled "Detainees, Torture, and Incom-
petence in the 'War on Terror.'''J As the title indicates, the piece is highly critical of 
US actions over the past six years, and uses a review of three different books as a 
launch pad for its arguments. In brief, Professor Roberts takes a largely retrospec-
tive look at US detention and interrogation policies since September 11 ,200 1, ar-
guing that a number of US decisions along the way led to the abuses at Abu Ghraib. 
He recognizes that it is complicated to apply the law of war to certain individuals 
fighting US forces in different conflicts. but he concludes that the President's deci-
sion to treat them "humanely" in 2002 did not provide a dear legal framework and 
charges the Bush Administration with both bad intentions and incompetence. 
Professor Roberts discusses the legal and policy confusion that currently exists in 
Afghanistan among the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the 
government of Afghanistan related to detainee treatment, and proposes that 
NATO establish rules for treatment of detainees who are not entitled to prisoner of 
war status. Finally, he reflects the often-heard concern about a perceived threat to 
US separation of powers principles and condudes that the resort by the United 
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States to a "war on terror" paradigm leaves quite a bit to be desired, even in the 
wake of all of the changes the US government has put in place since September I I. 
By way of response, I will spend my time discussing three issues: where US law 
and policy currently stand in the three conflicts the United States is fighting, the 
processes by which we arrived at our current positions, and how we might address 
some of the ongoing legal and operational confusion in Afghanistan among NATO 
allies. In foc using on the current state of US law and policy, I do not mean to sug-
gest that several still-unresolved debates about the applicability of the Geneva Con-
ventions-and of the war paradigm to our struggle with al Qaeda more generally-
are irrelevant. But to move this multiyear dialogue fOlWard, I think it is important 
to use the current state of playas the jumping-off point, whatever one may think of 
the decisions that the United States made in the immediate aftermath of September 
11,200 1. 
Before I dive in, I would like to say something about the abuses of detainees de-
scribed in the books that Adam Roberts has reviewed. Like many in the US govern-
ment, including the military itself, I will not and cannot defend that abuse. Events 
like Abu Ghraib have been devastating to the reputation of the United States, espe-
cially in European and Arab States. Professor Roberts raises a number of argu-
ments about the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and with al Qaeda with which I 
do not agree, and which I look forward to addressing. But I wanted to make clear 
up fro nt that detainee abuse warrants no defense. 
II. Where We Are Now-A Snapshot 
The State Department's Legal Adviser, John Bellinger, spent a week in January 
seMng as a guest blogger on Opinio Juris, a website devoted to international law 
and politics. He posted pieces on Common Article 3, unlawful belligerency and the 
US conflict with al Qaeda, among other topics.2 Professor Garraway served as a 
guest respondent and opened his post with an old Irish saying. The saying involves 
a foreigner who asks an Irishman for directions from his current location to the 
nearest town. The Irishman tells him, "Well, I wouldn't start from here!"3 But 
"here" is precisely where I would like to start. As I noted, Professor Roberts con-
cludes his review with an assertion that the United States continues to rely on 
flawed structures and rules to deal with its conflict with al Qaeda, and bemoans 
where the United States has ended up in 2007. To evaluate this conclusion, let's 
take a snapshot of where we are right now, putting aside the various legal develop-
ments that have gotten us to this point. 
Because different legal paradigms apply to US conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and with al Qaeda, I will treat each of them separately. 
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A. Afghanistan 
ISAF is operating in Afghanistan under (most recently) UN Security Council Reso-
lution 1707, a Chapter VII resolution that authorizes member States participating 
in ISAF to "take all necessary measures to fulfi] its mandate."4 The United States 
takes part in ISAF and also continues to lead a coalition called Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF), the force that intelVened in Afghanistan in November 2001 after 
the United States decided to respond in self-defense following the September 11 at-
tacks. The United States has not formally revisited its view that the conflict in Af-
ghanistan is an international armed conflict. The argument that it remains an 
international armed conflict is based on the fact that the US government and the 
coalition forces that are part ofISAF and OEF continue to fight the same entities 
that OEF began to fight in 200 I, at which time it clearly was an international armed 
conflict between the United States and the Taliban. 
In this ongoing conflict, the United States applies the rules on targeting appro-
priate to international anned conflict-most notably, distinction and proportion-
ality, as well as limitations on the use of certain weapons. Professor Roberts 
acknowledged US targeting rules in a talk he gave at the Brookings Institution in 
2002, where he stated, "In the conduct of the air war [in Afghanistan ], as in Iraq in 
'91 and as also in Serbia in '99, the United States clearly accepted the relevance and 
indeed value of the rules restricting targeting to militarily significant targets and I 
think that needs to be frankly and honestly recognized. "5 US Department of De-
fense (000) policy, as reflected in the 000 directive on the Law of War Program, 
is that 
members of the DoD Components comply with the law of war during all armed 
conflicts. however such conflicts are characterized. and in all other militaryoperations. 
and that the law of war obligations of the United States are observed and enforced by 
the DoD Components and DoD contractors assigned to or accompanying deployed 
Armed Forces.6 
The Directive defines "the law of war" as encompassing "all international law for 
the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens, in-
cluding treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, 
and applicable customary international law ." This reflects a decision by the US mil-
itary that, as a general matter, applying the rules of international armed conflict to 
all conflicts however characterized (I ) is the right thing to do as a moral and hu-
manitarian matter and (2) gives the military a single standard to which to train. 
The US processing and treatment of detainees in Afghanistan is governed by 
several laws and policies. To ensure that we are detaining only those people who 
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pose a security threat, we have established status review processes (just as we have 
in Iraq and at Guantanamo). The first review takes place at the time of capture to 
determine if the person being detained is an enemy combatant. The second review 
occurs usually within seventy-five days and in no event more than a hundred days 
of the individual's coming into DoD custody. The review is based on all reasonably 
available and relevant information. A detainee's status determination may be sub-
ject to further review if additional information comes to light. The combatant 
commander may interview witnesses and/or convene a panel of commissioned of-
ficers to make a recommendation to him . That commander must review the de-
tainee's status on an annual basis, although he has tended to do so every six 
months. The Review Board also nominates certain Afghan detainees for entry into 
Afghanistan's reconciliation program. The government of Afghanistan then vets 
the nominees and selects some to return to their village elders to be reintegrated.' 
We also have established dear treatment rules. First, the Detainee Treatment 
Act of 2005 (DTA) makes clear that no detainee in US custody or control, regard-
less of where he is held or by which US entity, may be subjected to cruel, inhwnan 
or degrading treatment,S as those terms are understood in the US reselVations to 
the Convention Against Torture (CAT).9 Second, the DoD detainee directive is-
sued in September 2006 provides that "all detainees shall be treated humanely and 
in accordance with U.S. law, the law of war, and applicable U.S. policy."IOThe latter 
further states that all persons subject to the Directive shall apply at a minimum the 
standards articulated in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions with-
out regard toa detainee's legal status. The Directive also requires that detainees not 
be subjected to public curiosity, reprisals, medical or scientific experiments, or sen-
sorydeprivation. And it states that all persons in DoD control will be provided with 
prisoner of war protections until a competent authority determines some other le-
gal status. Some have expressed concern that the rules in the Detainee Directive are 
policy protections, not legal protections. But soldiers who mistreat detainees can 
be prosecuted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 
Finally, interrogations of individuals in DoD custody, wherever held, are gov-
erned by the Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations, 
which is publicly available, and which expressly prohibits a number of interroga-
tion techniques, including using military working dogs, inducing hypothennia or 
heat injury, applying physical pain, and placing hoods or sacks over the eyes of 
detainees. II 
Does all this mean that the conflict in Afghanistan no longer poses hard legal, 
policy or tactical questions? It does not. These are the US rules, but thirty-seven na-
tions contribute to ISAF, and each contingent operates within a different legal 
framework.. The contributing member States have different views about what type 
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of conflict exists in Afghanistan; some question whether an armed conflict exists at 
all. I will address lingering complications about the situation in Afghanistan later 
in this article. 
B. Iraq 
The activities of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) currently are governed by 
a UN Security Council resolution issued pursuant to Chapter VII. Under Resolu-
tion 1546, which the Security Council adopted unanimously on June 8, 2004, the 
mandate ofMNF-1 is "to take all necessary measures to contribute to the mainte-
nance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters [from Secretary 
of State Powell and then-Iraqi Prime Minister AyadAllawi] annexed to this resolu-
tion."12 The annexed letters describe a broad range of tasks that MNF-I may under-
take to counter "ongoing security threats," including "internment where this is 
necessary for imperative reasons of security."13 The letter from Secretary Powell 
states that the "forces that make up the MNF are and will remain committed at all 
times to act consistently with their obligations under the law of armed conflict, in-
cluding the Geneva Conventions. "14 
Security Council Resolution 1546 required review of the MNF-I mandate 
within twelve months. Subsequent resolutions have extended this authority tem-
porally-most recently Resolution 1723, which extends the Resolution 1546 man-
date until December 2007 . Resolution 1723 affirms the importance for all forces 
promoting security and stability in Iraq to act in accordance with the law of armed 
conflict, and the annexed letter from Secretary Rice states that the forces that make 
up MNF- I remain committed to acting consistently with their obligations and 
rights under international law, including the law of armed conflict.ls 
The detention standard contained in Resolution 1546 ("imperative reasons of 
security") is drawn directly from Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention,I6 
and was included in the annexed letters to indicate that the same basis for 
detentions that coalition forces applied before J une 28, 2004 would contin ue to ap-
ply after governing authority was transferred to the sovereign government of Iraq. 
Domestic Iraqi law (in the form of CPA Memorandum No. 317) provides detailed 
requirements fo r the conditions and proced ures for security internment, including 
review of detention within seven days, as well as further periodic reviews. These pe-
riodic reviews occur in the form of the Combined Review and Release Board 
(CRRB), a majority-Iraqi board that assesses the threat posed by each detainee. IS 
Memorandum No. 3 states that the operation, condition and standards of any in-
ternment facility established by MNF- I shall be in accordance with the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, Part III, Section IV.19 (This includes requirements to provide 
internees with food, water, clothing and medical attention, and give them the 
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ability to hold religious services, engage in physical exercise, and send and receive 
letters.) Memorandum No.3 requires MNF-I to release individuals from securi ty 
internment or transfer them to the Iraqi criminal justice system no later than eigh-
teen months from the date of detention, unless further detention is approved by 
the loint Detention Committee, which is staffed by senior officials.20 The CPA 
Memorandum also provides for guaranteed International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRe) access to internees.21 
To break my own rule and dive backward into history, I want to correct 
misimpressions about whether the United States as a government ever asserted 
that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to its conflict with the government of 
Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent occupation of Iraq. Professor Roberts refers in his 
review of Mark Danner's book Tortureatld TrUll! to an excerpt of an e-mail written 
in mid-August 2003 from a captain in military intelligence in Iraq.22 That e-mail 
suggests that the captain believed that he could apply different rules of engage-
ment and interrogation techniques to "unlawful enemy combatants" detained in 
Iraq. Danner also cites an effort by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, then-
Commander MNF-I, to change the legal status of some of those detained to "unlaw-
ful enemy combatants";23 however, General Sanchez did not have the authority to 
make that determination. Indeed, this was not and did not become US policy. In 
mid-2004, then-Secrctary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated, "Iraq's a nation. 
The United States is a nation. The Geneva Conventions applied. They have applied 
every single day from the outset. "24 
Similarly, in his commentary The Torture Memos,25 Josh Dratel fails to distin-
guish between the different rules that apply to Afghanistan, Guantanamo and Iraq; 
he is not correct when he asserts that the United States desired to abrogate the 
Geneva Conventions with respect to the treatment of persons seized in the context 
of armed hostilities in Iraq. The Geneva Conventions applied directly to that con-
flict up to the end of occupation on June 28, 2004, and continued to apply-as the 
Conventions require-to any individual who remained detained as a prisoner of 
war or protected person. The Security Council resolutions, the annexed letters re-
ferring to MNF-I compliance with the laws of war and CPA Memorandwn No.3 
now provide the governing rules for MNF-I, and US laws such as the Detainee 
Treatment Act26 and the War Crimes Act27 provide additional rules for the US con-
tingent ofMNF-1. 
C. Conflict with al Qaeda 
The United States is aware that many States and scholars continue to be skeptical 
that a State can be in an armed conflict with a non-State actor primarily outside 
that State's territory. However, the United States, for reasons the State Department 
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Legal Adviser has set forth publicly in some detail, continues to believe that such a 
conflict can and does exist. The US Supreme Court has supported that view, most re-
centlyin Hamdatl v. RumsJefd.18 ln the wake of that opinion, the protections of Com-
mon Artiele 3 apply to all members of al Qaeda detained in that conflict. Those al 
Qaeda members we detain in Afghanistan and Iraq are subject to the detention and 
review provisions I have already described. The treatment of al Qaeda members de-
tained at Guantanamo is governed by the DTA and the Army intelligence collec-
tion manual.19 (All of the detainees there are in DoD custody.) Further, because the 
Supreme Court has held that our conflict with al Qaeda is a non-international 
armed conflict, the Military Commissions Act (MCA)30 provisions that criminalize 
violations of most provisions of Common Article 3, including torture, cruel treat-
ment, intentionally causing serious bodily injury, rape and mutilation, would ap-
ply to those who mistreat al Qaeda detainees. The ICRC has access to everyone held 
at Guantanamo. 
The detention review process for individuals held at Guantanamo, many of 
whom are associated with al Qaeda, is somewhat different from review processes in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. I assume that the readers are familiar with the Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), by which the United States determines whether 
these individuals are in fact enemy combatants. As recently updated in the MCA, 
detainees may appeal their CSRT determination to a federal civilian court, the DC 
Circuit Court of Appeals. That Court, in the Bismullah v. Gates and Parhat v. Gates 
cases, currently is considering the evidentiary standards by which it will review 
CSRT decisions.)! There is another process by which the United States reviews on-
going detention in Guantanamo: when the CSRT upholds a detainee's status as an 
enemy combatant and the United States does not intend to prosecute the detainee 
in a military commission, the detainee receives an annual review by an Administra-
tive Review Board (ARB), which assesses whether he continues to pose a seriousse-
curity threat to the United States. Hundreds of individuals have been released from 
Guantanamo since it opened, under the CSRT and ARB processes. 
These processes are more detailed and more regularized than the Article 5 tribu-
nals that the Third Geneva Convention delineates for cases of doubt regarding 
prisoner-of-war status. This is so btxause we are trying to balance--on the one 
hand-the fact that the law of war recognizes that a State can detain enemy com-
batants figh ting against it until the end of the conflict with-on the other hand-
an acknowledgment that the end of this conflict may be a long way off. The United 
States is aware of concerns about indefinite detention that flow from the fact that 
this conflict is of indefinite length and has taken these steps so that we are not hold-
ing anyone longer than necessary. 
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D. Hard Questions 
This is where the law, rules and procedures have ended up in mid-2007. I will leave 
it for others to discuss whether or how Abu Ghraib might have been avoided. But 
in any case it should be dear that these issues are hard, and getting it right has taken 
some trial and error. We are not the first government to have grappled with diffi-
cult questions at the beginning of a period of violence and terrorist attacks, and we 
will not be the last. Professor Roberts has described elsewhere the fact that the 
United Kingdom initially ignored international standards of treatment in North-
ern Ireland, which "led them into terrible trouble."n In fact, the United Kingdom 
in the initial, militarized phase of the "Troubles" occasionally used "war talk," al-
though, unlike the United States, the government generally did not characterize 
the fighting as an armed conflict in the legal sense.33 The UK government resorted 
to detention without charge and interrogation techniques that the European Court 
of Human Rights later deemed to violate the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) . Professor Roberts makes a fair point about the lessons of history in 
his book review: any State fighting a non-State actor, including the United States, 
would be well selVed to pay attention to the examples of the United Kingdom in 
Ireland and the French in Algeria. 1 was not working on these issues at the time, but 
I expect that there was a strong belief that an attack by nineteen terrorists that killed 
over three thousand people in one day lacked historical precedent in key ways. 
Even Professor Roberts recognizes that it was not obvious how to apply existing 
laws and rules to this type of non-State actor. 
If application of law of war rules to the confli ct with al Qaeda were easy, we 
would not see so many people-in fo reign governments, non-governmental orga-
nizations and the academy-hold so many different views on how to treat this con-
fli ct. Some say it is not an armed conflict, so the United States should have used law 
enforcement measures to quash al Qaeda after the 9/1 1 attacks. Others say that 
there is an armed conflict in Afghanistan, but that a State cannot be in an armed 
conflict with a non-State actor outside its terri tory without also being in an armed 
conflict with the State in which the non-State actor is operating. Yet others ac-
knowledge that a State can be in an extraterritorial armed conflict with a non-State 
actor when hostili ties between those groups meet the threshold level of violence 
that consti tutes an armed conflict. The US government has explained elsewhere 
why exclusive reliance on a law enforcement paradigm was not possible, and de-
scribed how the UN Security Council and NATO have recognized that non-State 
actors can engage in armed attacks against States at a level to trigger that State's 
r ight of self-defense. But we recognize that others do not agree. 
Even the more traditional conflicts are complicated. The Geneva Conventions 
provide rules for a three-stage process: armed conflict between States, occupation 
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by one State of the other State and peace. But what happens when, as in Iraq, armed 
conflict continues after occupation ends? What is the status of the many different 
conflicts in Iraq? Or in Afghanistan, where a new government took power less than 
a year after the figh ting began, b ut the conflict between the United States and the 
Taliban continues? If the Afghan conflict has switched from international to non-
international, what does that mean for those detained in the international phase of 
the conflict? Does it matter for allies in a coalition with a host government how that 
host characterizes the violence? Can Chapter VII resolutions render some of these 
questions moot? These are not easy questions, and we continue to work with our 
allies to find good answers. 
III. How We Got Here-The US System 
With regard to the United States and the three armed conflicts I have discussed, 
many look at the glass as still half-empty. This seems to be due at least in part to the 
suspicion about the United States that the last five years has engendered among le-
gal scholars, European allies and human rights advocates. These views are colored 
by abuses in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib , by objections to the CIA interrogation 
program and undisclosed detention facilities overseas, and concern about the use 
of rendi tions. But one may also look at the current state of law and practice as a 
glass half-full, where the United States has built on the decisions made in 2001-02 
to move to a clear, robust framework for treatment, where everyone knows the 
rules. In addition to assessing the substance of the current rilles, I also want to talk a 
bit about the process by which we arrived "here," because that process is another 
reason to be optimistic about the United States. 
We arrived "here" in 2007 as the result of vigorous debate and activity within 
each of our three branches of government . The executive branch established a 
number of detainee policies related to the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban 
in Afghanistan and set up military commissions to try those suspected of war 
crimes and related offenses. In 2001, Congress passed the Authorization to Use 
Military Force,14 and later enacted the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military 
Commissions Act. The federal courts have opined on several of these executive de-
cisions about detainee policies and military commissions, and on the MCA. This, 
in my view, speaks to the strength of the US constitutional system. Professor Rob-
erts expresses a sense that our bedrock separation of powers principles are threat-
ened and suggests that the executive branch has dominated the decision making. 
Consider, however, recent comments by Professor Neil Katyal, who argued the 
Hamdan case in the Supreme Court on behalf of the detainee. He states, "1 believe 
that the Hamdan decision-which invalidated the President's system of military 
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commissions-represents a histor ic victory for our constitutional process, and, in 
particular, the role of the United States Congress and federal judiciary in our tri-
partite system of government. "3S He also stated: 
[A]s a student of history, I know it's hard for the Supreme Court in a time of armed 
conflict to rebuke the President . ... And here the Administration has managed to [lose 
a case during armed conflict ] several times . ... [The Department oOustice] said . . . 
[detainees] won't have habeas corpus rights. Well, the Supreme Court said no in the 
Rasul case. The Administration said that U.S. citizens can be held indefinitely 
incommunicado. The Supreme Court said no in Hamdi. The Administration said, you 
can have military commission [sic] and try these people. The Supreme Court said no in 
Hamootl. 36 
The justices themselves seem confident that our separation of powers is healthy. 
In Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Hamdan, he writes that the Court's con-
clusion "ultimately rests upon a single ground: Congress has not issued the Execu-
tive a 'blank check."'37 He furthe r describes the majori ty opinion as keeping "faith 
in those democratic means" necessarily implicit in the Constitution's tripartite 
structure. These statements recall Justice Souter's concurrence in Hamdi, in which 
he stated, "For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of government 
asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on which to rest the Nation's re-
liance in striking the balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the 
way to victory. . "38 
Many, including Professor Roberts, might have wished for us to get to this place 
in the first instance-to get it right immediately after September 2001, with cool 
heads and a clear understanding ofthe lessons of history. It would have saved years 
in litigation, permitted the United States to try detainees accused of war crimes 
much faster and avoided significant tension with European allies-but we did not 
develop on September 12 all of the processes and laws we have in place now. It is 
important to recognize, however, that the Supreme Court has confirmed several of 
the Administration's basic legal positions with respect to its detention policies. It 
has confirmed that the United States is in a state of armed conflict with al Qaeda. It 
has confirmed that the law of war, and in particular Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions, applies to that conflict. 
More fine-tuning is likely to follow because there are several important cases 
pending or on appeal in our courts. I already mentioned the Parhat case, where 
the DC Circuit will decide whether it can look to documents beyond those con-
tained in a detainee's CSRT record to determine whether to uphold the CSRT de-
termination. A panel of the Fourth Circuit recently decided the AI Marri case.39 In 
2003, the United States detained a1 Marri as an enemy combatant; at the time of aI 
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Marri's detention he resided in the United States. (He has been held in a brig in 
South Carolina since that time.) The United States agreed that the detainee had 
constitutional rights, including a right to habeas corpus, but argued that the Mili-
tary Commissions Act applied to him, and that Congress in the MCA had created 
an adequate and effective substitute by which al Marri could contest his detention. 
The Fourth Circuit panel held that the Military Commissions Act did not apply to 
al Marri; that the Court therefore had jurisdiction over his habeas corpus claim; 
that al Marri had constitutional due process rights; and that, despite the Presi-
dent's detennination in 2003 that al Marri was an enemy combatant closely asso-
ciated with al Qaeda, the United States could not detain al Macri as an enemy 
combatant because it had not properly detennined that he (1) was a citizen or 
member of an armed force at war with the United States, (2) was seized on or near 
a battlefield on which an armed conflict with the United States was taking place, 
(3) was in Afghanistan during the armed conflict there, or (4) directly participated 
in hostilities against the United States or its allies.40 The Court granted al Marri ha-
beas relief, while noting that the US government was free to prosecute him for 
criminal offenses."] The United States has appealed this decision, seeking rehear-
ing tn bane. 
Another court will consider whether Majid Khan, one of the fourteen detainees 
brought to Guantanamo Bay in September 2006 and someone to whom the US 
government previously had granted asylwn, has a constitutional right to habeas 
corpus. And as military commissions get under way, we should expect to see ap-
peals of final commission decisions to the DC Circuit, which will need to interpret 
the standards of review contained in the DT A, as amended by the MCA. And it is 
clear, even now, that the military judges are acting independently. In the Khadr and 
Hamdan cases, the two military judges dismissed the prosecution cases without 
prejudice. The basis for their decisions was that the CSRTs had not determined that 
the accused were "unlawful" enemy combatants (a prerequisite status for trial by 
military commission), but rather that they simply were enemy combatants. It 
seems safe to say that we have not seen the last of any of the three branches as we at-
tempt to "strik[el the balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the 
way to victory." 
N . Lingering Confusion-Afghanistan 
Just because the US government has a clear set of rules for detention in Afghanistan 
does not mean that we are working seamlesslywith allies that have different rules. 
Professor Roberts flags the "precious little unifonnity" and "ongoing policy confu-
sion" in Afghanistan. This is particularly true on detainee issues: some States are 
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reluctant to detain combatants at all, other States hand detainees over quickly to 
the government of Afghanistan and yet other States choose not to transfer all of 
their detainees to the Afghans. Why is this the case, and can we move toward 
greater harmony? 
A. Differen t Views of the Conflict 
One reason that contributing States approach detainee treatment differently in Af-
ghanistan is that they take different views of the legal nature of the situation there. 
There are four possible positions: that it is an international armed conflict; that it is 
a non-international armed conflict; that it is not an anned conflict at all. and thus 
that ISAF is engaged in security or peacekeeping operations; and that. depending 
on the level of hostilities, it is at times an armed conflict and at times a security 
operation. 
As 1 mentioned earlier. the argument that it is an international armed conflict 
flows from the idea that the conflict is very similar to the conflict that began in 
November 200 1 in Operation Enduring Freedom and that the initial conflict has 
continued without interruption between the same parties. Under this theory. the 
right to self-defense continues. the consent of the government of Afghanistan to 
troop presence is important but not necessary. and individuals detained in the in-
ternational armed conflict may continue to be detained.~ 2 It is not clear whether 
the Hamdatl decision. which deemed at least the al Qaeda part of the conflict 
non-international, affects the US view of the status of the conflict in Afghanistan. 
The argument that it is a non-international armed conflict flows from a belief 
that, as of June 2002, when the Karzai government took power. the conflict in Af-
ghanistan evolved away from a conflict between two States (the classical conflict 
identified in Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions) and became a conflict 
between the new Afghan government and countries supporting it on the one hand. 
and Taliban andal Qaeda forces on the other. Thus. the conflict resembles an inter-
nationalized non-international armed conflict of the type that Hans-Peter Gasser 
described in 1983.43 The lCRC takes this view. and asserts that Common Article 3. 
customary international law applicable in non-international armed conflicts and 
Afghan human rights laws apply to the conflict.oW Canada presumably also takes 
this view: although it is treating its detainees in Afghanistan consistent with the 
Third Geneva Convention, it appears to be doing so as a matter of policy. not law. 
However, the fact that it is relying on a core law of war treaty for detention guid-
ance suggests that it views the situation as an armed conflict.45 
Third. the German government may not believe that it is an armed conflict at 
all. German documents describing its role in Afghanistan refer only to stability 
operations-the documents make no reference to armed conflict.46 This seems 
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surprising, given the level of violence, numbers of troops killed and widespread 
use of military responses around the country to suppress the Taliban. Finally, at 
least one State seems to take the view that the situation fluctuates between being 
an armed conflict and falling below the threshold of conllict that triggers applica-
tion of the law of war. 
What is the view of the Afghan government on this question? It is not clear that 
the government has formally stated its view that this is or is not an armed conllict, 
but its use of its military to fight the Taliban and detain individuals without charge, 
as well as its consent to the presence of thousands of foreign troops who continue to 
engage in combat operations, suggests that the Afghan government would conclude 
that it is in an armed conflict. It has not, however, invoked a state of emergency un-
der its constitution. If it is a non-international armed conflict, Common Article 3, 
customary intemationallaw applicable in Common Article 3 conflicts and Afghani-
stan's domestic human rights obligations would govern Afghanistan's treatment of 
detainees held in the conflict. (This explains why the ISAF/Interim Administration 
document that Professor Roberts cites refers to the Interim Administration's obli-
gation to conform with "internationally recognized human rights.") 
It should also be recognized that Security Council Resolution 1707 provides a 
legal basis under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for ISAF operations, including de-
tention, regardless of the nature of the fighting in Afghanistan. In some respects, 
this makes the need to resolve the precise nature of the conflict less important, as 
ISAP's authorities under the resolution do not depend on the nature of the conflict 
(or even on the continued existence of a conflict) . It also suggests that potentially 
differing views of the conflict by ISAF members need not prevent effective deten-
tion operations on the ground. One could imagine some kind of future arrange-
ment whereby ISAF States were to agree that they would, at a minimum, apply 
Common Article 3 to detainees; and that States could at their discretion apply 
higher standards of treatment as a matter of policy; and if the Afghan government 
agreed that it would apply Common Article 3 and applicable human rights provi-
sions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights47 and the govern-
ment of Afghanistan's consti tution and laws, then it may not be necessary formally 
to reconcile the competing descriptions of what is happening on the ground in 
Afghanistan. 
B. Different Legal Obligations and Domestic Politics 
Another reason that ISAP States have taken diverse approaches to detention is that 
they have different legal obligations and face different political pressures. Most no-
tably, European member State contributors to ISAF may be concerned that, in 
some circumstances, the European Convention on Human Rights4ll extends to 
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their activities outside their own terri tories, even during armed conflict. In A/-
Skein; and others v. SecretaryoJState Jar Defence, for instance, the United Kingdom 
conceded that the ECHR applied to its detention of one individual who died in its 
custody in Iraq.49 The UK Court of Appeal upheld a High Court finding that the 
United Kingdom's Human Rights ActSO and the ECHR applied to that individual's 
case because he was within the authority and control of UK forces in Iraq.51 The 
House of Lords has just upheld that decision, with the apparent result that any per-
son held by UK forces abroad (and therefore in the United Kingdom's "effective 
control") would be covered by the Human Rights Act and the ECHR.52 Similarly, 
the European Court of Human Rights, in the Saramati case, just considered 
whether troops from France, Gennany and NOlWay, acting as officers of the NATO 
Peacekeeping Force in Kosovo (KFOR) and UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), vio-
lated Articles 1, 5, 6 and 13 of the ECHR in detaining a particular individual.S) And 
in the Behram; case, the European Court of Human Rights just considered whether 
France violated an individual's right to life when the individual died from unex-
ploded ordnance in the area of Kosovo in which France was participating in the 
KFOR mission.54 The European Court of Human Rightsconduded that these cases 
were inadmissible because each respondent State's acts were "attributable" to the 
United Nations, pursuant to Chapter VII authority that authorized KFOR and 
UNMIK, and that the European Court of Human Rights was not in a position to 
scrutinize these acts. The Court, therefore, was not forced to address how it would 
have decided the questions if the States had been acting in their sovereign capacities. 
Even though France, Germany and NOlWay won their cases, one imagines that 
the possibility of such cases, and the lingering ambiguity about whether the Court 
would have reached a different conclusion if the States were not acting under UN 
auspices, must create different, and potentially very cautious, political and legal ap-
proaches to conflict and peacekeeping for ECHR States parties. 
In addition to the ECHR, most NATO member States are parties to Additional 
Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions,55 whereas the United States is not. 
In the Afghan conflict, it is not clear whether this fact would have (or has had) 
any significant impact on the ground. Further, most NATO member States be-
lieve that their legal obligations flowing from treaties such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights$/) and the Convention Against TortureS? 
apply to their activities extraterritorially. This may account for the fac t that the 
bilateral agreements between NATO States and the Afghan Ministry of Defense 
regarding individuals detained by ISAF contain provisions that appear to reflect 
the non-refoulement obligations contained in Article 3 of the CAT. The United 
States historically has not taken the position that its CAT obligations apply 
extraterritorially, although as a matter of policy the United States will not transfer 
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an individual outside of its territory to a country where it is more likely than not 
that he will be tortured. 
Human Rights Watch has described these bilateral arrangements with the gov-
ernment of Afghanistan as follows: 
[TJhey share many common features, such as an agreement that NATO forces will 
release detainees or transfer them to Afghan custody within 96 hours, and that NATO 
and Afghan authorities will treat detainees in accordance with international law. The 
agreements further stipulate that Afghan authorities will not try, release, or transfer 
detainees to a third country without the explicit agreement of NATO forces 
(presumably to avoid transfer of detainees to ... jurisdictions where detainees may be 
subject to mistreatment). Under the agreements seen by Human Rights Watch, NATO 
forces, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross, will have access to 
detainees even after they have been transferred to Afghan custody.58 
When Canada operated as part of OEF, the Canadian forces turned detainees 
over to US forces in Afghanistan, but came under public pressure not to do SO.59 
Under the original 2005 Canada-Afghanistan Detainee Transfer Arrangement, the 
Afghanistan Independent H wnan Rights Commission had guaranteed that it 
would report any abuses to the Canadian government. As a result of public con-
cern about the mistreatment in Afghan custody of detainees turned over by Cana-
dian forces, the Canadian government recently amended the 2005 Arrangement 
to bring it into line with pre-existing Denmark-Afghanistan, United Kingdom-
Afghanistan and Netherlands-Afghanistan arrangements/,o The new Arrangement 
allows Canadians to enter Afghan detention facilities at "any tim e. "61 
The United States in its OEF capacity has been cautious about turning over de-
tainees to the government of Afghanistan, due in part to our desire to confirm with 
greater clarity the legal basis on which the government of Afghanistan would hold 
them. Contrast the Canadian position: General Gauthier, the lieutenant general 
who commands the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command and thus oversees 
all Canadian forces deployed abroad, was quoted as saying, "Our default setting is 
transfer. We haven't held anybody for more than a few hours and we would prefer 
not to. "62 As a result of certain allies' concerns about turning detainees over to the 
United States or to the Afghans, some allies are choosing not to detain at all, which 
renders the mission less effective.63 
Consider the following by David Bosco: 
About 7,000 troops from Canada, Britain and the Netherlands are fending off a Taliban 
resurgence. The demanding mission . .. has also confronted all iance members with the 
uncomfortable reality that fighting often means taking prisoners. America, of COUf!>e, 
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has been taking prisoners in Afghanistan for some time. And that's part of the problem. 
The European and Canadian publics have been disgusted by reports of prisoner abuse, 
and they want nothing to do with what they see as American excess ... . So NATO 
countries have essentially opted out of the detainee business. Before committing their 
troops to combat areas, the Canadian, Dutch and British governments signed 
agreements with the Afghan government stating that any captured fighters would be 
handed over to Afghan authorities rather than to American forces. In practice, these 
agreements mean that NATO troops have no system in place for regularly 
interrogatingTaliban fighters for intelligence purposes. Whenever possible, they let the 
Afghan troops they operate with take custody. When that's not possible, they house 
their prisoners briefly in makeshift facilities while they arrange a transfer to the 
Afghans. NATO guidelines call for the handover of priwners within 96 hours, far too 
brief a time for wldiers to even know whom they're holding. And once prisoners are in 
Afghan hands, international forces easily lose track of them. It's not good policy. Not 
only is NATO forfeiting the intelligence benefits that can come with real-time 
interrogation, it's sending detainees into an Afghan prison system poorly equipped to 
handle them and rife with abuse.64 
A H uman Rights Watch report confirms the reluctance to detain that Bosco de-
scribes. That report, fro m November 2006, states, 
Dutch forces operating in Oruzgan announced their first five detainees two weeks ago, 
while British and Canadian forces operating in Helmand and Kandahar, respectively, 
have publicly acknowledged fewer than 100 detainees. Given the ferocity of the fighting 
in these areas, the absence of more detainees raises two alarming alternatives: either 
that NATO forces are not taking detainees, or, more likely, that NATO forces are 
circumventing their bilateral agreements by immediately turning over detainees to 
Afghan authorities and thus abrogating their responsibility to monitor the detainees' 
treatment.6S 
Even the poli tical approaches to the figh ting in Afghan istan are different. The 
New York Times described the Dutch and US approaches as follows: 
[HJere in Uruzgan Province, where the Taliban operate openly, a Dutch-led task force 
has mostly shunned combat. Its counterinsurgency tactics emphasize efforts to 
improve Afghan living conditions and self-governance, rather than hunting the 
Taliban's fighters. Bloodshed is out. Reconstruction, mentoring and diplomacy are in. 
American military officials have expressed unease about the Dutch method. warning 
that if the Taliban are not kept under military pressure in Uruzgan, they will use the 
province as a haven and project their insurgency into neighboring provinces. 66 
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C. Toward Greater Hannonization 
Presumably greater harmony in our approach to the situation in Afghanistan 
would be useful, as it would permit us more easily to transfer detainees among the 
various contingents, increase the intelligence we can gather from detainees, ap-
proach the Afghan government with a united front, and increase interoperability. 
Can we achieve greater harmonization? Professor Roberts suggests that the gov-
ernment of Afghanistan establish a country-wide detention regime, although it is 
not clear ifhe is suggesting that the regime would or should apply to individuals 
picked up and held by ISAF fo rces as well. He also suggests that NATO develop a 
binding set of rules on all aspects of treatment of security detainees not entitled to 
prisoner-of-war protections. This seems sensible, although NATO already tried 
once to achieve such a framework for Afghanistan and was able only to come to 
agreement on broad parameters.67 Other ideas might include a new UN Security 
Council resolution containing language parallel to Resolution 1546, and a more 
detailed framework modeled on CPA Memorandum No.3 (such that standards of 
any internment facility shall be in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
Part lll, Section IV). Finally, ISAF States could agree as a policy matter to treat all 
detainees in their custody as prisoners of war. One might also explore practical 
changes as well, such asa "left-seat, right-seat" approach to Afghan detention facil-
ities, whereby the government of Afghanistan runs the detention facility with assis-
tance and oversight by NATO forces from different countries. Any such solutions 
would require certain legal and political concessions from both the US government 
and other NATO contributors. 
V. Conclusion 
I would like to circle back to Professor Roberts's ongoing discomfort with the US 
efforts dealing with the "war on terror" since September 11. Professor Roberts, like 
many other critics of US policy over the last six years, is concerned about the 
phrase "war on terror." But the phrase "global war on terror" is a political state-
ment, not a legal assertion.68 The United States uses this term to mean that all na-
tions must strongly oppose terrorism in all of its forms, around the world. We do 
not think we are in an armed conflict with all terrorists everywhere. We do, how-
ever, believe that we are in a legal state of armed conflict with al Qaeda, which in-
cludes an armed conflict in Afghanistan. That said, the questions raised by this 
anned conflict are difficult, and the laws in place on September II-internationally 
and domestically-were not crafted to deal with the factual scenario we suddenly 
faced. In working through these difficult problems, the balance of powers in the 
US system has worked-not failed-for many of the critical elements of the three 
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conflicts discussed. I would challenge this audience and our friends and critics to 
look objectively at where the law now stands, and determine on that basis whether 
a detention framework now exists that strikes an appropriate and durable balance 
between humanitarian concerns and military requirements in this and future 
non-traditional conflicts. 1 would also suggest that detention in Afghanistan pres-
ents hard questions not just for the United States but for all States contributing to 
lSAP, and that we should continue to put our heads together on these difficult and 
pressing questions. 
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